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INTRODUCTION

E

mpirical evidence demonstrates that mergers, on average, create
value for shareholders of the merging firms.' The relevant question
from an antitrust perspective, however, is the source of these gains.
Increased efficiency is one possibility. It is also possible that in some cases
merger gains derive not from enhanced efficiency, but rather from an
enhanced ability to realize "monopoly profits."
To determine whether a proposed merger is likely to be pro- or
anti-competitive, economists often follow the approach outlined in the
United States Justice Department's Merger Guidelines and ask whether
the merger seems likely to facilitate (express or tacit) collusion.2 Thus,
economists are concerned primarily with horizontal mergers-mergers
between firms in the same industry-and only when the relevant market
is highly concentrated and entry of new firms is difficult.
When only a few firms in a market into which entry is difficult
account for most of the sales of a product, they may either
explicitly or implicitly coordinate their actions to eliminate
rivalry on price and non-price variables ....
Therefore, a merger
that would eliminate a significant competitor in an already
highly concentrated market into which entry is difficult may

*Senior

Economist, Lexecon, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.

See, e.g., Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific
Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983).
2 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Merger Guidelines (June 14, 1984).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1986

1

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:401

enhance the ability of the remaining firms to exercise market
power. 3
In reviewing the competitive effects of the proposed sale of Conrail to
Norfolk Southern, the Justice Department took the position that the
standards it uses to analyze mergers under the Clayton Act 4 are
"substantially the same" as the standards used by the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) in analyzing railroad mergers coming
before that body. 5 This paper is not a critical review of the Justice
Department's economic analysis of the recently abandoned transaction
between Conrail and Norfolk Southern, nor is it a legal analysis of the
Justice Department's position that its standards are those of the ICC.
The subjects of this paper are more general. First, we explain in more
detail the conventional economic analysis of the competitive effects of
mergers and how that analysis should be applied in the railroad
industry. Defining the relevant market receives special emphasis.
Second, we consider whether there is anything extraordinary about the
railroad industry that renders the conventional analysis incomplete or
inappropriate.

II.

DEFINING THE RELEVANT MARKET IN RAILROAD MERGERS

To determine whether a merger is likely to reduce competition significantly, economists and the courts usually begin by defining a relevant
market or markets. This frequently is the most significant issue in the
entire analysis, since a given horizontal (or, in the railroad context,
parallel) merger can appear troubling or innocuous depending whether
the relevant market is defined narrowly or broadly.
As discussed in the Merger Guidelines, an economically meaningful
market is one that could be subject to the exercise of market power-the
ability to raise price and thereby restrict output below the competitive
level. To determine whether a proposed definition of the market is
economically meaningful, the Guidelines suggest the following conceptual experiment: Suppose all firms in the proposed market were able to
collude perfectly and attempted to raise price. Would their hypothetical
collusion be successful, or would consumers switch to other products, or
would firms now supplying other products quickly convert their facilities
and begin production of the product in question, or would firms from
other areas begin selling in the geographic area in question? If any of

I Letter from J. Paul McGrath to Elizabeth H. Dole 2 (Jan. 29, 1985) (concerning the
proposed sale of Conrail to Norfolk Southern) [hereinafter cited as McGrath Letter].
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et seq. (1976).
McGrath Letter, supra note 3, at 2 n.2.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss3/5

2

1986]

COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF MERGERS

these responses would occur significantly, the proposed market is defined
too narrowly. 6
A.

Intermodal Competition and the Relevant Product Market

The central question in defining the relevant product market for
railroading is the proper treatment of intermodal competition--competition from transportation alternatives such as trucks, pipelines and
barges. Without question, there is substantial railroad traffic that would
shift to other modes if the relevant price of rail transportation rose.
Equally certain, however, there is other traffic, such as coal en route to
7
electric utilities, that is effectively "locked in" to rail transportation.
In a market in which all customers paid the same price for service, the
proper antitrust treatment of intermodal competition would depend on
the relative sizes of the two types of traffic and each type's elasticity of
demand for rail services. That is, we know from economic theory that
when all customers pay the same price, the elasticity of aggregate
demand for any product or service is a weighted average of the demand
elasticities of individual consumer groups, where the weights are determined by each group's share of total consumption. Therefore, if most rail
traffic is easily divertible to other modes, and if all traffic paid the same
rates, then the aggregate demand for rail services would be highly elastic
and economics would dictate including intermodal competition in the
8
relevant market.
In reality, however, different shippers pay different rates for reasons
unrelated (or at least not completely related) to differences in cost. Put
differently, the ratio of revenue to variable cost varies considerably
across types of traffic. Economists call this phenomenon price discrimination.
Price discrimination in the railroad industry may constitute a relatively efficient method of covering fixed costs in an industry with large
economies of scale; scale economies in railroading will be discussed in
more detail in Part III below. The important point here, however, is that
whenever price discrimination is feasible, there is basis for defining
relevant markets more narrowly than when all customers pay the same
price. 9 It may not matter to customer A if two formerly competing

6 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, at 3-5.

See, e.g., Friedlander & Spady, A Derived Demand Functionfor FreightTransportation, 62 REV. ECON. STAT. 432 (1980); Devin, Allocation in Surface Freight Transportation:
Does Rate Regulation Matter?, 9 BELL J. ECON. 18 (1979); Winston, A DisaggregateModel of
the Demand for Intercity Freight Transportation,49 ECONOMETRICA 981 (1981).
' On the relationship between elasticity of demand, market power and definition of the
relevant market, see Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV.
937 (1981).
9 See, e.g., Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, at 9.
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railroads become one because A may be protected by truck competition.
But customer B may lack this intermodal option and therefore B's
transportation costs may rise sharply as a result of such a merger.
In sum, even though there is significant intermodal competition in
the railroad industry, because price discrimination is demonstrably
feasible, there is basis for treating railroads alone as a relevant product
market.
B. The Relevant Geographic Market
At one time, analysts of railroad mergers viewed relevant geographic
markets in terms of city-pairs or "corridors." It was felt that in the
railroad industry:
[tlhe product bought by consumers, and hence the market as well,
must be defined as the transportation between two specific
geographical points. Assuming a concern only with the nature of
competition between carriers of the same type, the sellers for a
particular rail transportation market are the railroads connecting any given pair of cities. 10
This city-pair or corridor focus never made much economic sense and
analysts accustomed to analyzing mergers in other industries have now
abandoned this approach. For example, in identifying potentially troublesome markets in connection with the sale of Conrail to Norfolk
Southern, the Justice Department defined geographic markets in terms
of individual points." That is, the Justice Department examined rail
shipments into and out of individual counties rather than focusing on
shipments between pairs of points.
The fallacy in the city-pair or corridor approach is easily explained.
Consider Figure 1 in which railroads 1 and 2 are the only rail connections
between points A and B. Even if these two railroads merge, thereby
creating a rail "monopoly" in the corridor between A and B, shippers and
consumers in A and B may be relatively unaffected. As shown in the
figure, they may still have opportunities to transport goods to or from
points such as C, D, E, and F using other railroads, The relevant economic
question with respect to shippers and consumers at points A and B is the
number of effective rail outlets still available after the merger. Focusing
exclusively on the rail options between city-pairs can easily lead to
incorrect conclusions.

10

J. Meyer, M. Peck, J. Stenason & C. Swick,

TRANSPORTATION INDUSTFIES

THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE

205 (1960).

" In most cases, counties were selected as the defined geographic market. McGrath

Letter, supra note 3, at 3-6.
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Figure 1
Rail Outlets At Points A and B

The discussion above of the relevant product and geographic markets
in railroading is meant to be suggestive of the proper approach. It is not
designed as a complete prescription, and it is important to emphasize that
the analysis of a railroad merger (or, for that matter, any merger) should
not be overly mechanical. For example, suppose product X can be shipped
economically only by rail; railroads 1 and 2 are the only railroads
delivering X to point A; and the two railroads merge. On the surface, such
a merger appears troubling from an antitrust perspective.
Suppose, however, that customers in A have the ability to buy X
produced locally. Or suppose customers in A can substitute another
product Y which is shipped by truck. Or suppose customers in A can
escape the apparent rail bottleneck by using an intermodal alternative to
short-haul X from the lines of another railroad. An overly mechanical
approach to analyzing railroad mergers may miss these more subtle
substitution possibilities, each of which reduces the likelihood that the
merger will have significant anticompetitive effects.

III.

ARE RAILROADS DIFFERENT?

Railroad executives and lawyers generally resist the proposition that
railroading is just another industry that can be analyzed using the same
methods appropriate, for example, to a manufacturing industry or
retailing. In making the case for special treatment, two features of the
industry tend to be emphasized. First, it is said that railroads are unlike
other industries because railroading is subject to large economies of scale
(or, more accurately, density). This, it is suggested, can make rail
consolidations desirable even though, in the short run, there may be some
loss of competition. The argument is that, but for the consolidations,
railroads may be reluctant to invest in track and equipment for fear that
"destructive competition" will prevent them from earning a normal
return on investment. Section A evaluates this argument.
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The second argument for special treatment of railroad mergers emphasizes the fact that the railroad system in the United States is a network
of independent firms in which much traffic is handled by more than one
railroad. This, it is suggested, means that in railroading there is the
possibility of anticompetitive effects arising from vertical (end-to-end) as
well as horizontal (parallel) mergers. The argument is that railroads
have an incentive to maximize the length of haul which is unrelated to
efficiency. Therefore, the argument goes, following an end-to-end merger,
the enlarged railroad may refuse to interchange traffic with independent
connecting railroads even if the traffic could be moved at lower cost over
the independent railroad. Section B considers this argument about
inefficient "diversions."
A.

2
"DestructiveCompetition"1

Recent economic studies of cost conditions in the railroad industry
indicate that railroading is characterized by economies of (or increasing
returns to) density. 13 That is, holding constant track miles and the
quality of track, an increase in traffic results in a less than proportionate
increase in total costs. Put differently, marginal cost in the railroad
industry is less than average total cost, where average total cost includes
a normal return on investment in fixed capital.
In any industry where firms operate in a region of increasing returns
to scale, there is an economic conundrum. To encourage efficient use of
existing facilities, it is desirable that price equal marginal cost. Consumers determine their level of purchases by determining at what point the
marginal value of additional purchases just equals the price they have to
pay. Thus, when price equals marginal cost, the value of the last unit to
consumers just equals the additional cost required to produce it and
output (or utilization) is at the economically efficient level. A price
greater than marginal cost results in too little output; a price below
marginal cost results in too much output.
The conundrum is that when firms operate in a region of increasing
returns to scale, marginal cost is less than average total cost. Consequently, if the price of all units equals marginal cost, the firms will not
cover average total costs. In the short run this "revenue inadequacy" is
insignificant from the perspective of the overall economy. The problem,
however, arises in the long run: If firms anticipate being unable to cover

12 This section has benefited especially from conversations with Professor Dennis

Carlton, of the University of Chicago and Lexecon, who has analyzed the proposed merger
between the Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific. See Verified Rebuttal Statement of Dennis
W. Carlton, Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp.-Control-SouthernPacific Transp. Co.Merger-Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Transp. Co., DRGW-33 (May 29, 1985).
13 See, e.g, Braeutigam, Daughtey & Turnquist, A Firm Specific Analysis of Economics
of Density in the U.S. Railroad Industry, 33 J. IND. ECON. 3 (1984).
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average total costs, they will be reluctant to make new investmentsinvestments that may have a value to consumers greater than the
investment required. Thus, when marginal cost is less than average total
cost, tensions may arise between short run and long run efficiency.
In the absence of competition, there are well known ways out of this
conundrum. The best solution is some form of two-part pricing. For
example, customers may pay a lump-sum or access fee designed to cover
fixed costs and then pay a price equal to marginal cost of each unit of
production or service purchased. Two-part pricing preserves investment
incentives yet also creates the proper incentives to utilize existing
facilities. A second-best solution is some form of "Ramsey" or "value of
service" pricing, in which all customers pay a price somewhat in excess of
marginal cost, with the most price-inelastic customers facing the highest
mark-up.14

Generally, when there are economies of scale over all or most of the
range of output in a market, economists expect to find only one firm
operating. Cost conditions seem to indicate a natural monopoly. To
explain, suppose one railroad already has lines between points A and B
and the volume of traffic is such that there are still economies of greater
density. It seems unlikely under such conditions that another railroad
would lay parallel lines. Entry would require an investment in track that
would be largely sunk once made-there is not the same ability to
redeploy railroad track as there is, say, to redeploy jet aircraft within the
network of a commercial airline company. Under these cost conditions,
entry is very risky. If, upon entering, competition caused the price of
service between points A and B to drop to marginal cost, the entrant could
suffer large losses. Price would be less than average total cost yet,
because the fixed costs of the track would be largely sunk, the costminimizing strategy for the entrant at that point would be merely to
carry on. Such a dismal prospect obviously is a deterrent to potential
entrants.
The interesting and difficult public policy questions arise when, for
whatever reasons, parallel lines exist and competition drives prices
toward marginal cost. Pleading "destructive competition" and "revenue
inadequacy," the railroads propose to merge. The railroads concede (at
least implicitly) that the merger will eliminate competition and result in
higher prices in the short run, but argue that without some kind of
restriction on competition, neither railroad will have sufficient incentive
to invest in track maintenance or in upgrading track quality. Therefore,
it is claimed, the long run benefits to shippers and consumers of the
merger more than offset any short run losses from higher rates.

"4 See Baumol & Bradford, Optimal Departuresfrom Marginal Cost Pricing,60 AMER.
ECON. REV. 265, 278-79 (June 1970).
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This argument is logically consistent. The problem, however, is distinguishing cases where the argument may have merit from cases where the
argument is advanced, but the short-run/long-run trade-off in fact tips in
favor of preserving intramodal competition in the short run. In this
regard, we have the following observations:
1. The usual backdrop for the argument that merger is needed to
preserve investment incentives is a backdrop of revenue inadequacy-the
railroads' systemwide revenues are less than total costs, where total costs
include a return on investment. It is important to note, however, that the
relevant question with respect to a proposed merger is not systemwide
revenues and costs, but rather revenues and costs from the operations in
the area affected by the merger. Suppose, as in Figure 2, that railroad 1
had lines from A to B and from B to C, while railroad 2 has lines only from
B to C. A merger of the two railroads addresses and potentially cures the
revenue inadequacy problem only on operations between B and C.
Therefore, to determine relevant revenue inadequacy, railroad l's revenues and costs on operations between A and B should be backed out of the
analysis to the extent possible.

2
A

B

C

Figure 2
A Railroad Merger With Parallel and End-to-End Dimensions

2. Suppose this accounting adjustment is made and revenues in the
relevant area still appear less than total costs. The argument for
restricting competition is that this is the only way to preserve investment
incentives. Note, however, that the argument assumes that reinvestment
is desirable, which may or may not be the case. The operations may be in
an area where demand for railroad services has declined to a point where
the socially optimal course is to discontinue further investment.
3. Now suppose that revenues in the relevant area are less than total
costs and that reinvestment is socially desirable. The next question,
usually unexamined by the argument for merger, is whether restricting
competition in fact is necessary to preserve investment incentives.
Merger proponents advance the following scenario: Each railroad assumes that, if it invests, its rival will also invest and competition
inevitably will drive price near marginal cost. Therefore, fearing this
"destructive competition," both are reluctant to invest in the first place.
But this is just one scenario, and there are other scenarios with equal
basis in economic theory. For example, another model is: Each railroad
knows that if it is the first to make a new investment (such as upgrading

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss3/5

8

1986]

COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF MERGERS

track quality), its competitor at that point, fearing the same postinvestment competition discussed above, may be reluctant to follow suit.
Therefore, rather than investment paralysis, one instead might observe
15
the parallel railroads for strategic reasons actually racing to invest.
4. Finally, suppose that revenues are less than total costs in the
relevant area; that reinvestment is socially desirable; and that a fear of
post-investment competition dampens investment incentives. There is
still a question whether the long-run loss from underinvestment is
greater or less than the possible short-run losses to the economy from
reduced inter-railroad competition. Perhaps the economy as a whole is
better off if the competition between the railroads is allowed to play itself
out.
In sum, the "destructive competition" argument for mergers between
parallel railroads is logically consistent from the perspective of economic
theory. However, before accepting the argument as justification for an
otherwise anticompetitive merger, a number of difficult questions require
addressing.
One postscript to this discussion: It is sometimes argued (incorrectly)
that because there are economies of density in railroading, a merger
between parallel railroads permits cost-savings even in the short runtraffic can be directed over the lines of one railroad, yielding lower
average total costs. This argument is a classic example of the sunk cost
fallacy. Assume marginal (not average) costs are constant or rise with
added volume and that the two railroads operate equally efficiently (i.e.,
have the same variable cost for a given volume of traffic). Then reallocating traffic in the manner described saves absolutely no costs. Total
variable costs are the same (and possibly higher, if marginal costs are
rising). Total fixed costs, being fixed, are unaffected. Therefore, total
costs in the short run are the same (if not higher). Put differently, the
decrease in one railroad's average total cost is offset (and possibly more
than offset) by a necessary increase in the other railroad's average total
cost.
B.

Inefficient Diversions

The "destructive competition" or "revenue inadequacy" argument is an
argument sometimes used to defend railroad mergers that, using conventional analysis, may appear anticompetitive. The argument about inefficient diversions is at the opposite end of the rhetorical spectrum-an
argument sometimes used to oppose end-to-end railroad mergers that,
using conventional analysis, may appear procompetitive. In general,
end-to-end railroad mergers offer the promise of more reliable and more

15 For a model of strategic behavior similar to this, see Spence, Entry, Capacity,
Investment and OligopolisticPricing,8 BELL J. ECON. 534 (1977).
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timely service without any of the concern about reduced competition
16
generated by parallel mergers.
As mentioned above, the inefficient diversion argument starts from the
premise that railroads have an incentive to maximize their length of haul
for reasons unrelated to efficiency. Therefore, the argument goes, when
railroads 1 and 2 in Figure 3 merge, they have an incentive to refuse to
interchange traffic with railroad 3, even if railroad 3 is a more efficient
carrier between points B and C for some types of traffic.

2

A

C

B
3
Figure 3
An End-to-End Merger Between Railroads 1 and 2

In a world in which railroads can freely negotiate how they divide
revenues from traffic moving over more than one line-a world we
understand has existed since the Staggers Rail Act of 198017-this
argument is difficult to accept. The problem is the underlying premise:
that railroads have an incentive to maximize their length of haul for
reasons unrelated to efficiency. Not only is the premise unexamined by
proponents of the argument; it also is inconsistent with rational economic
behavior.18
A numerical example may help highlight the fallacy. Suppose in
Figure 3 that the variable costs of moving a shipment between B and C
over railroad 2 are $10, while the costs are only $5 if the shipment moves
over independent railroad 3. Suppose also that the variable costs of the
short haul from A to B over railroad 1 are $2 and, for simplicity, assume
that the rate charged from A to C is $15, whether or not the shipment is
interchanged at B.
If the newly merged railroads 1 and 2 move the shipment from A to C,
profits are $3 (= $15 - $2 - $10). If instead railroad 1 interchanges with
railroad 3, total costs are lower and total profits increase to $8 (= $15 $2 - $5). Even though it means accepting a short haul, the merged
railroad has a powerful profit motive to interchange with railroad 3.

16

See, e.g., Harris & Winston, Potential Benefits of Railroad Mergers, 65 REv. EcoN.

STAT. 32 (1983).
'7

Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980).

Is For a similar argument to that presented below, see McFarland, RailroadCompetitive
Access: An Economic Analysis, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Econ. Policy Office Discussion Paper
(Nov. 20, 1985).
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Railroad 1 is better off accepting the short haul provided merely that it
receives more than $5 of the $15 in total revenues. For example, suppose
the division is $6 to railroad 1 and $9 to railroad 3. Railroad 3 covers its
cost and makes $4 (= $9 - $5) in profit. More importantly for the analysis,
the profits of railroad 1 rise to $4 (= $6 - $2) from the no-interchange
level of $3.
The general point, which is really an implication of the famous Coase
Theorem in economics,' 9 is that inefficient routing creates an opportunity
for gains from trade. As just shown, correcting the inefficicency creates
added value and, provided transactions costs are low enough to make
negotiations feasible, revenue divisions can be arrived at that provide all
parties concerned with sufficient incentive to make the necessary routing
adjustments.
What then to make of complaints about inefficient diversions? One
likely possibility is that these are the complaints of a connecting railroad
that has enjoyed a favorable division, which it fears it will have to
renegotiate to retain traffic. For example, suppose that before the merger
between railroads 1 and 2, railroad 3 received $11 on traffic moving over
its lines on the way from A to C. After the merger, to induce the merged
railroad to interchange and route efficiently, railroad 3 will have to cut
its division of revenues to $10 or less. Naturally, it does not welcome the
adjustment.
Finally, note that this discussion, while critical of the argument that
railroads have an incentive to route inefficiently, does not imply that
end-to-end mergers necessarily, in all cases, enhance efficiency. Indeed,
the analysis just presented suggests a possible bargaining motive for
end-to-end mergers completely unrelated to efficiency. In terms of the
example above, suppose that the merger between railroads 1 and 2
generated only modest improvements in quality of service that were more
than offset by diseconomies from creating an overly large firm. 20 Nevertheless, the merger might appear privately profitable if the result was, as
in the example above, an ability to force connecting railroads to accept
lower divisions. But this source of private profit is just a pecuniary
economy-a transfer from one railroad to another. From the perspective
of the overall economy, the merger would be inefficient.

"9Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.

LAW

EcoN. 1 (1960).

20 Note that there is no inconsistency between economies of density-where, holding

track-miles constant, more traffic leads to lower average total costs-and diseconomies of
size-where expanding the number of track-miles leads to a more than proportionate
increase in costs. Economies of density neither imply nor are implied by economies of size.
See Braeutigam, Daughtey & Turnquist, supra note 13, at 4.
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CONCLUSIONS

This paper has explained the basic economies of defining relevant
product and geographic markets in the railroad industry. The principal
conclusion with respect to the product market is that, because price
discrimination appears feasible, railroads alone can comprise a relevant
product market, intermodal competition notwithstanding. The principal
conclusion with respect to the relevant geographic market is that a focus
on city-pairs or corridors is misguided.
The paper has also examined two arguments suggesting that the
conventional methods used to analyze the competitive effects of mergers
are inappropriate or incomplete in the context of the railroad industry.
With respect to the "destructive competition" or "revenue inadequacy"
argument, we conclude that the argument is logically consistent, but that
there are many difficult questions which must be answered before one
can decide what weight to give the argument in any particular case. In
contrast, we conclude that the usual form of the inefficient diversions
argument is implausible since it requires irrational economic behavior.
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